Kids in River Rest can't play in the creek behind their homes. The back field where they used to play sports and camp out — families call it the "Poop Field" now, because it floods with sewage when it rains. Manholes sit open and unattended. The smell reaches people's porches.
In March 2025, 200,000 gallons of raw sewage poured into Cartwright Creek and the Harpeth River. Another 57,000 gallons followed in April. In July, multiple overflows triggered public health warnings and emergency response. This wasn't a freak accident — it was the worst in a decade-long pattern of failure: 68 violations in a single year, over $100,000 in state fines, broken equipment, moldy tools, lab samples stored next to food.
The company responsible — Central States Water Resources — promised to fix all of this when it bought the system in 2021. Nearly four years later, performance didn't improve. It got worse. And now they're asking Tennessee to let them run an even bigger, more complex facility.
This isn't just a local problem. CSWR customers in six states report the same pattern: acquire failing systems, raise rates 200–350%, and fail to deliver. Mississippi regulators denied their rate increase. Kentucky's Attorney General called their acquisition plans "sincerely worrying." In Texas, KSAT's investigation into brown, chlorinated water led to two new state laws. And CSWR's own engineering director testified under oath about raw sewage and pathogens dumping into creeks "where maybe kids play."
The Harpeth River has been impaired for phosphorus for 21 years. Tennessee law says you cannot add more of the pollutant that's already killing the river. TDEC has failed for 10 years to complete the legally required pollution reduction plan. And when Franklin — an excellent operator on the same river — sought a smaller 33% expansion, TDEC imposed strict conditions including a zero net increase commitment and proven optimization. Limestone, a far worse operator seeking a far larger expansion, faces none of those requirements.
Expansion is a reward for success, not a remedy for failure.
Below is the factual evidence supporting this position — 16 sections covering every argument, with verified sources for every claim.
What's at Stake
TDEC proposes to modify NPDES Permit No. TN0027278 to allow Limestone Water Utility Operating Company, LLC — owned by Central States Water Resources (CSWR) — to expand wastewater treatment capacity from 0.25 MGD to 0.45 MGD. That is an 80% increase in treated sewage discharged into the Harpeth River at River Mile 68.8.
The Harpeth has been listed as impaired for phosphorus since 2004 (21 years) and for nutrients since 1996 (29 years). The facility discharges phosphorus and oxygen-depleting pollutants — the exact pollutants causing the impairment.
The opposition rests on six core legal arguments plus comparative evidence — CSWR's documented multi-state pattern, Mississippi's regulatory rejection, national benchmarking data, and compounding technology risk. Each argument independently supports denial; together they are overwhelming.
Who's Involved
The Regulator: TDEC
Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, Division of Water Resources — issues and enforces wastewater discharge permits under the federal NPDES program.
The Applicant: Limestone / CSWR
Limestone Water Utility Operating Company, LLC, owned by Central States Water Resources (CSWR), which acquired the facility December 21, 2021. CSWR operates water/wastewater systems across at least six states with a documented pattern of acquiring failing systems, raising rates dramatically, and failing to achieve proportional compliance improvements.
The Affected Community
River Rest neighborhood (185 homes), Grassland area residents, downstream Harpeth users, and ratepayers. The expansion would add service for Nash Ridge and Adley subdivisions. Close to 300 utility customers filed comments on CSWR's related $9.5M rate increase (TPUC Docket 24-00044).
Key Legal Framework
Federal Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.) — Section 303(d) requires impaired-water TMDLs. Section 402 establishes NPDES permits. 40 CFR § 122.4(i) prohibits permits that don't conform to applicable TMDLs.
Tennessee Water Quality Control Act (T.C.A. §§ 69-3-101 et seq.) — State implementation of the Clean Water Act.
Tennessee Antidegradation Rule (0400-40-03-.06) — Governs how much pollution can be added. The single most important rule in this case.
The Antidegradation Policy Interpretation
Tennessee's antidegradation framework creates tiers based on whether a river is healthy or struggling:
Tier 2 — Healthy waters: Small new pollution allowed under "de minimis" exception (<5% single, <10% cumulative).
Tier 3 — Impaired waters: "No additional degradation may be allowed."
The Harpeth at this discharge point is Tier 3 — impaired for over two decades.
The Dispute
TDEC says: 80% volume increase is OK because improved treatment concentration means no net increase in total mass of pollutants.
Opposition says: The policy says "cannot authorize additional loadings" — absolute language. It doesn't say "cannot authorize if concentration increases." Expanding capacity by 80% enables 80% more sewage generation. That is additional loading capacity, regardless of per-gallon concentration.
The Franklin Precedent
In 2017, the City of Franklin — upstream on the same river — sought a 33% expansion (12→16 MGD).
Harpeth Conservancy appealed. Franklin committed to zero net increase and demonstrated it could deliver: phosphorus dropped 58% (126→53 lb/day) through optimization before expansion finalized.
Franklin had a "strong history of consistently outperforming permit limits."
If TDEC's current interpretation were correct, Franklin's zero net increase commitment would have been unnecessary. That TDEC required it — for an excellent performer seeking a smaller expansion — suggests TDEC historically read the policy more strictly than it's claiming now.
| Factor | Franklin (2017) | Limestone (2025) |
|---|---|---|
| Capacity Increase | 33% (12→16 MGD) | 80% (0.25→0.45 MGD) |
| Compliance Record | Excellent Outperformed limits | Terrible 68 violations, $100K+ fines, 257K gal spills |
| Zero Net Increase | Required | Not Required |
| Optimization Demo | Required 58% P reduction | Not Required |
| River Mile | RM 85.2 (upstream) | RM 68.8 (downstream = cumulative) |
Mercury Exceeds De Minimis Standards
TDEC's own Permit Modification Rationale (page MOD-5) admits mercury exceeds the 10% de minimis threshold.
Proper procedure: Applicant demonstrates compliance → Permit approved.
TDEC's procedure: Expansion exceeds de minimis → Impose new mercury limit (0.0001376 mg/L) → Call it compliant.
The applicant should prove they meet the standard before approval, not have compliance manufactured after exceeding the standard.
Ten-Year TMDL Implementation Failure
40 CFR § 122.4(i): "No permit may be issued for a discharge which does not conform to an applicable TMDL."
TDEC cannot fail for a decade to implement mandated pollution reductions while simultaneously authorizing capacity expansions that enable more sewage generation in the impaired watershed.
Limestone's Compliance Record
2018: 68 violations — broken/corroded equipment, moldy tools, lab samples stored next to food.
2014–2024: Over $100,000 in TDEC fines.
2022: 29 violations (post-CSWR acquisition).
March: ~200,000 gal into Cartwright Creek / Harpeth River.
April: ~57,000 additional gallons.
July: Multiple overflow events, emergency response, public health warnings.
CSWR acquired December 2021 promising improvements. 3.25 years later: worst spills in facility history. Performance declined, not improved.
NC5 — Decade of Problems (Jul 2025) NC5 — Upgrade Plans (Oct 2025) WH — Commissioners Concern (Aug 2025)Collection System Failures & Line Extension Ban
With SSOs in March, April, and multiple July 2025 events, the facility exceeds the 5-SSO threshold. The same section requires new capacity be offset by documented I&I removal — no study or remediation plan appears in the rationale.
Arbitrary and Capricious Agency Action
Franklin (excellent performer, 33% expansion) got strict conditions. Limestone (terrible performer, 80% expansion) gets none. For this to survive legal challenge, TDEC needs a rational basis for why the worse performer gets easier treatment. There isn't one.
Limestone discharges at RM 68.8, downstream of Franklin at RM 85.2 — cumulative impact makes stricter standards more necessary, not less.
CSWR's Documented Multi-State Pattern
Limestone's problems are not isolated. A December 2025 Mississippi Today investigation documented CSWR customer complaints across six states with identical issues: dramatic rate increases (200–350% in 2–3 years) without proportional service improvements. This is a corporate-level pattern, not a local anomaly.
Food & Water Watch analysis shows privatized water rates increase at 3x inflation (avg 18% every 2 years). The ten largest privatizations (1990–2010) saw rates nearly triple in ~11 years. CSWR's 200–350% increases in 2–3 years dramatically exceed even this concerning benchmark.
CSWR's Own Engineer: Sworn Testimony
The most damning evidence comes from inside CSWR. Jacob Freeman, CSWR Engineering Director, testified under oath to the Mississippi PSC (December 2025):
Freeman also testified that utilities not meeting limits "can choose to only be tested during suitable weather conditions when it's less likely to have a violation" — acknowledging strategic testing avoidance to hide non-compliance.
Mississippi PSC Denial
In February 2025, Mississippi's Public Service Commission voted 2-1 to deny CSWR's (Great River subsidiary) rate increase — a rare rebuke of a regulated utility.
National Performance Benchmarks
Limestone is an extreme outlier — not just locally, but nationally:
| Facility | Violation Rate | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Limestone (2018) | 68/yr | Broken equipment, moldy tools, improper lab procedures |
| Aqua NC — Beau Rivage | ~13.5/yr | 81 violations over 6 years. Considered troubled — still 5x better than Limestone's worst. |
| Franklin, TN | Near zero | "Consistently outperforming limits." Same river, municipal operator. |
| American Water | 99.9% | Largest US private water utility. Industry benchmark. |
Academic Research
A peer-reviewed study (Cambridge University Press, 2020) analyzing EPA data found:
Translation: private utilities may strategically under-test to avoid discovering expensive problems. This matches CSWR's own engineer's testimony about strategic testing avoidance.
Spill Magnitude in Context
While major metro failures involve far larger volumes (DC Water: 243M gal; LA: 12.5M gal), Limestone's 257,000 gallons is disproportionately massive for a 0.25 MGD plant serving ~450–600 homes. It represents more than a full day's treatment capacity released as raw sewage — indicating chronic operational failure, not an isolated event.
Cambridge — Private vs Public SDWA Study Port City Daily — Aqua NC ViolationsTechnology Complexity & Compounding Risk
The expansion doesn't just add volume — it replaces simple technology with complex technology, operated by a company that can't manage the simple version.
68 violations/yr, $100K+ fines, 257K gal spills — 3.25 years after acquisition. Baseline is failure.
Simple extended aeration (1970s) → Aerobic Granular Sludge requiring chemical dosing, real-time ORP/DO/TSS/SVI monitoring, Grade IV certification (currently III).
80% capacity increase + Nash Ridge & Adley subdivisions. Proportional failure at 0.45 MGD = ~463,000 gal potential spill.
I&I acknowledged, no study, no remediation. New capacity consumed by rainwater. Bigger wet weather overflows.
21 years impaired for phosphorus. Zero margin. Spills directly harm failing ecosystem at RM 68.8.
Six states, identical complaints. Own engineer's sworn testimony. MS PSC denial. KY AG concerns.
Extended aeration is simple, proven 1970s technology. Air is pumped into sewage; microorganisms break down waste. Forgiving of operator error.
Aerobic Granular Sludge (AGS) is advanced tech requiring precise chemical dosing, real-time multi-parameter monitoring, careful sludge management with backup haulers, and higher-certified operators. Better results when run correctly — but demands significantly more skill and investment.
Incapable Operator + Complex Technology + Larger Scale + Broken Infrastructure + Impaired Waters + Corporate Pattern = Predictable Disaster
These factors multiply, not add. An operator who can't maintain simple technology should not be entrusted with advanced technology at 80% larger scale, discharging into an impaired river, with unresolved collection problems, backed by a company whose own engineer describes "a very, very bad situation." This is the mathematical consequence of observed performance projected onto increased complexity and scale.
Full Timeline
What We're Asking For
Primary: Deny the Permit
Each argument independently supports denial. The comparative evidence — across six states, from CSWR's own engineer, from Mississippi regulators — makes the case that failure is not just possible but predictable.
Alternative: Conditions Stricter Than Franklin
Because Limestone's performance is worse than Franklin's, conditions must be stricter:
36 months perfect compliance — zero violations, zero SSOs, full monitoring, independent third-party verification before construction begins.
Binding zero net increase with automatic suspension — total loading cannot exceed current levels; automatic permit suspension if exceeded.
Demonstrated 60%+ pollutant reduction through optimization before expansion authorized.
TMDL completion — waste load allocations established before expansion proceeds.
Comprehensive I&I remediation — documented removal ≥ 0.2 MGD before new connections.
Quarterly independent operational audits with publicly reported results.
$5M performance bond for emergency response costs.
Real-time public monitoring dashboard with SSO alerts.
Sources & Verification Links
Every claim is traceable to publicly available sources. Click to verify.
News & Investigative Reporting
- NewsNC5 — "Decade of problems revealed" (Jul 2025) — 68 violations, $100K+ fines, equipment conditions
- NewsNC5 — "Troubled plant submits upgrade plans" (Oct 2025) — 200K + 57K gal spills, comment period
- NewsMississippi Today — "Customers seeing 'astronomic' rate hikes" (Dec 2025) — CSWR multi-state pattern, engineer testimony, MS PSC denial, 6-state complaints
- NewsWilliamson Herald — Franklin appeal dismissed (Mar 2019) — 58% P reduction, "strong history"
- NewsWilliamson Herald — Commissioners concern (Aug 2025)
- NewsWDRB — KY AG "sincerely worried" (Jul 2024)
- NewsPort City Daily — Aqua NC Beau Rivage violations (May 2021)
- NewsKSAT San Antonio — "Brown, overly chlorinated water" (Feb 2025) — CSWR Texas operations
Environmental Organizations
- NGOHC — Phosphorus from Franklin
- NGOHC — Franklin Sewer Permit Alert (2022) — TMDL timeline
- NGOHC — Harpeth Impaired Status (2020)
- NGOHC — Petition for Permit Appeal (2017)
- NGOAmerican Rivers — Harpeth River Profile
- NGOFood & Water Watch — Privatization Facts (updated 2023)
- NGOHeal the Bay — Sewage Spills Context (2024)
- NGOSELC — Sewer Overflows (2024)
Academic & Industry
- AcademicARER Vol. 49 — Private vs Public Ownership SDWA (2020)
- AcademicAmerican Water — Benefits of Investor-Owned Utilities (99.9% claim)
Government & Legal
- LawTN Rule 0400-40-03 — Water Quality / Antidegradation (2024)
- LawJustia — TN Title 0400 Chapter 0400-40-03
- GovEPA — CWA Section 303(d) Overview
- GovTDEC — Harpeth River Watershed TMDL Development Page
- GovTPUC Docket 24-00044 — CSWR Rate Increase
- GovDraft Permit TN0027278 & Modification Rationale (Oct 2025) — MOD-1 through MOD-7, Section 2.3.2(d). Search permit TN0027278 in TDEC Data Viewer.
- GovTN Consumer Advocate, TPUC Docket 24-00044 (Apr 2025) — ~300 customer complaints noted
Supplementary Documents
- DocPublic Hearing Statement — Sample statement with placeholders for names and dates — customize before use
- DocComprehensive Public Comment — Sample public comment with placeholders for names and dates — customize before use
- DocComparative Analysis — CSWR performance vs. national standards, multi-state pattern, technology risk assessment